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Public Policy
Gerard M. Brannon*
Life insurance is one of the most heavily regulated businesses in the
United States economy. Because of the industry’s importance to Amer-
ican families, to our economy, and to our tax system, policy decisions
that affect life insurance products receive a great deal of scrutiny. That
scrutiny is likely to increase in the wake of recent insolvencies. The
purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for evaluating tax and
regulatory policies in the life insurance market.
Life Insurance Products
Life insurance companies are in the business of providing risk
coverage and investing the customer’s savings. Traditionally, they offer
insurance against three kinds of risk:
(1) Insurance against early death, which by analogy to insurance
against fire should have been called death insurance, but in a
masterstroke of salesmanship was called life insurance;
(2) Insurance against living too long, provided by life annuities;
and
(3) Insurance against accidents and sickness, through accident and
health insurance or disability insurance.
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The life insurance business also provides products that allow for
significant savings on a tax-favored basis. Savings products and risk
coverage are not necessarily joint products. Of the three types of risk
coverage offered, only the annuity requires the accumulation of signif-
icant savings. An annuity is an arrangement by which a group of people
pool their savings and the survivors draw on the pool.
A short-term insurance policy against death, called term life insur-
ance, does not differ significantly from fire or casualty insurance and
involves a very small amount of prepayment, or saving. To avoid
excessive administrative expenses in these kinds of policies, it is efficient
to sell a policy covering a period of a year or two.
By contrast, permanent or whole life insurance policies involve
more prepayment of premiums than term insurance, so the policy has
an identifiable cash value; it is a store of individual saving. Saving and
insurance motives can also be distinguished in the annuity field.
Annuities certain are pure savings products with a fixed payment
period; life annuities paid until death are insurance; and life annuities
with a minimum guaranteed payment period fall between pure savings
and insurance. Accident and health insurance can be handled like any
other line of casualty insurance, but a special noncancellable form
involves a savings accumulation similar to the savings element in
ordinary life.
Joint Savings and Life Insurance Policies
Rationalizations for combining life insurance and savings have
always existed. For example, one says that permanent life insurance is
necessary to protect the customer against becoming uninsurable. But
term policies can be guaranteed renewable if the company adds enough
to the premium to cover the risk. And permanent life insurance is not
needed to protect the customer from the high cost of term insurance at
older ages. The customer pays this cost under a permanent life policy as
well, but in ways that are not so apparent.
Some other rationalizations are not so easily dismissed (Belth
1967b). The "Christmas Club" reason for combining a savings product
with a life insurance product is the discipline of regular payment. The
"retirement" rationale says that when the need for life insurance
decreases after retirement, the cash value of the joint savings and life
insurance product can be used to help finance retirement.
Probably the most important reason for combining savings and life
insurance is that life insurance savings are taxed less heavily than many
other kinds of savings. Life insurance savings receive the treatment that
all savings would receive under a consumption tax. Two other forms of
savings that receive favorable tax treatment are pension savings and the
savings in the form of home ownership. Pension plans are slightly lessPUBLIC POLICY AND LIFE INSURANCE 201
Table 1
Distribution of Life Insurance Company Reserves
Percent
1955 1975 1989
Life Insurance 72,4 63.3 29.9
Health Insurance .8 2.7 2.8
Pension and Annuity 26.8 34.1 67.3
Source: American Council of Life Insurance (1990),
tax-favored than life insurance because pensions are taxed after a certain
age. whether or not the funds are saved. Home ownership is more
favored than life insurance savings; no tax is paid on the income in kind
produced by a home, and mortgage interest payments and real estate
taxes are deductible. Most other forms of savings, including bank and
thrift deposits, are taxed on an income basis; namely, interest earned is
taxed annually.
But the income tax system does not provide the only, or even the
most important, tax subsidy to financial institutions. Federal deposit
insurance provides a substantial subsidy to banks and an even larger
subsidy to thrifts. The Securities and Exchange Commission (1991)
recently completed a study of FDIC insurance and concluded that the
value of deposit insurance is three to five times greater than the
premium collected. During the 1980s, the annual value of this subsidy
was $20.3 billion. By comparison, the value of the tax subsidy to life
insurance (which is called a tax expenditure) was measured at slightly
less than $8 billion in the 1992 federal budget (OMB 1991, Part III, p. 17).
Total bank deposits are far greater than the liabilities of insurance
companies, however, and the relative subsidy is similar per dollar of
liabilities. The SEC study concluded that the subsidy to banks amounts
to about 100 basis points, a 16 percent subsidy when interest rates are at
6 percent. By comparison, since the average margir~al tax rate of
policyholders is in the neighborhood of 20 percent and some of the
inside buildup in life insurance is taxed when policies are surrendered,
the tax subsidy to life insurance is under 20 percent.
Historical Business Patterns
Table 1 shows how the life insurance company business has shifted
over time, away from traditional life policies and into the annuity
business, which is largely group annuities for pension plans. In 1955,
nearly three-quarters of all the reserves held by life insurance companies
were life insurance reserves, with slightly more than one-quarter in202 Gerard M. Brannon
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pension and annuity reserves. By 1989, the proportions were nearly
reversed. Much of this change is a result of the enormous growth in the
pension business but a good deal of the change can be attributed to
stagnation in the life business. Figure 1 shows the real value of life
reserves since 1955. Adjusted for loans to policyholders, which do not
decrease reported reserves, real (1982 dollars) life insurance reserves
were lower in 1988 than in 1955. Even without adjustments for policy
loans, real life reserves are lower now than they were throughout most
of the 1960s and 1970s. Both measures of reserves have grown in real
terms since the mid 1980s, however.
One reason for the anemic pattern in life reserves is that households
have moved away from life insurance products with a savings compo-
nent (a positive cash value). Term insurance, which requires fewer
reserves than permanent life, has become more popular. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of insurance in force between term insurance and
permanent life insurance since 1954. While term insurance accounted for
only 16 percent of all insurance in 1954, it represented almost one-half
the amount of insurance in force by 1989. It appears that even though
life insurance can contain both savings and insurance features, consum-
ers are increasingly separating their purchases of these products.
Demand for insurance is increasing. Life insurance in force as a percent
of personal income has increased fairly steadily since World War II, from
102.7 percent of personal income in 1950 to 196.3 percent in 1989.
This pattern in life reserves is apparent in household balance sheetsPUBLIC POLICY AND LIFE INSURANCE 203
Figure 2
Term Insurance as a Percent of Total
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as well. Life insurance assets as a percent of household financial assets
have declined from 7.3 percent of household assets in 1952 to 2.5 percent
in 1989 (Figure 3). During that period households shifted their financial
assets away from savings in life insurance products and direct owner-
Figure 3
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ship of corporate equities to two other tax-preferred savings vehicles--
homes and pensions (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
1990). The share of household assets in mutual funds also increased
beginning in the late 1970s with the rise in money market mutual funds.
The growth of mutual fund savings is particularly noteworthy because this
product offers neither the guarantees nor the tax advantages (for non-
pension funds) that are available to other forms of savings. In 1989, total
assets of mutual funds ($1 trillion) rivaled the assets of life insurance
companies ($1.3 trillion); and they amounted to one-half the assets of
commercial banks ($2.1 trillion) (Investment Company Institute 1990).
Life Insurance Regulation
From an early period in the United States, the sale of life insurance
has been regarded as a matter of unique governmental concern. In order
to make certain that funds are available to cover claims, insurance
companies are required to set aside reserves. Both the calculation and
the investment of these reserves are regulated by state law. The
regulation of actuarial reserve methods goes back to the work of Elizur
Wright in Massachusetts in the 1860s and the general pattern of the
other state regulations goes back to the findings of the Armstrong
Commission in New York in 1906.
The topic, public policy and life insurance, raises questions about
whether and how government should intervene in the life insurance
market. This discussion will begin by examining some of the arguments
used to justify government intervention. It will also refer to the politics
of regulation, recognizing the considerable literature that emphasizes
the "capture" of regulating institutions by those regulated.1
Special Problems in Life Insurance Markets
Adverse selection. Even though the private insurance market is a
market for dealing with risk, insurance companies profit by avoiding
risks. Successful insurance is based on the correct pricing and pooling of
risk. To the extent that companies can estimate different probabilities for
different classes of customers, it is profitable to introduce premium
differentials. Where they are prohibited, companies with more high-risk
customers will be less solvent, creating strong pressures to avoid
high-risk customers. Despite these economic forces, premium differen-
tials are sometimes viewed as unacceptable discrimination.
~ For a survey and some testing of alternative theories, see Peltzman (1989). And
Meier (1988) uses this approach to analyze life insurance regulation.PUBLIC POLICY AND LIFE INSURANCE 205
Moral hazard. Many forms of insurance tend to inflate the cost of the
insured event because they weaken the incentive to avoid these events.
Moral hazard is a more serious problem in the health insurance market
than in life insurance. Widespread misuse of health insurance increases
the use of medical services, drives up prices, and aggravates the
problems of the uninsured. Standard contract features such as co-
payments and deductibles are used to reduce moral hazard. In addition,
services most susceptible to moral hazard, such as cosmetic surgery and
psychiatry, are sometimes excluded from coverage. Providers of these
excluded services have successfully lobbied against coverage restrictions
in some states. The end result has been an increase in the price of health
insurance that has reduced coverage. The percentage of all workers
covered by a group health plan declined from 62 percent in 1980 to 57
percent in 1987.
Consumer information. Still another feature of the life insurance
market often used to justify regulation has to do with the complexity of
many life insurance products, which makes it difficult for consumers to
evaluate products rationally. Insurance pricing is so complex that it gave
birth to a new branch of mathematics. Some aids are available to
consumers, .such as the work of Belth, the Nader organization, and
Consumer Union.2 Some evidence shows that consumers do evaluate
policies rationally and that poorly priced policies do not survive in the
marketplace. Winter (1981) found very little variation in the prices of
insurance policies when all aspects of the policy are taken into account.
The Armstrong Commission (1906) made some early efforts to
standardize contract forms but substantial variety still remains. A
long-standing regulatory effort has been to simplify contract language.
The growing field of private insurance for nursing home costs is
particularly beset with the problems of defining the insurable event and
dealing with customer misperceptions about coverage under the policies.
Rationality of provision for death. Life insurance companies commonly
allege that consumers have an irrational reluctance to think about death.
The high selling expenses associated with life insurance policies are
often justified on the grounds that individual agents are needed to assist
customers in overcoming irrational avoidance behavior. The fact that life
insurance salespeople rate fairly high in occupational ranking suggests
customers think they get a valuable educational service from life
insurance agents.
The contention that consumers buy too little life insurance is
supported by economic analyses. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1989) exam-
2 Interestingly, Belth, a pioneer in the field of educating consumers about life
insurance, felt impelled to resign from a Consumer Union panel on life insurance and
publish a technical journal article explaining his differences (Belth 1967a).206 Gerard M. Brannon
ined life insurance purchases using three Surveys of Consumer Fi-
nances. The data provided information on some 1,200 families with both
spouses present and one or two spouses working. The data included
information on earnings, wealth, and pension plan entitlement, includ~
ing Social Security and life insurance coverage. Assuming that actuari~
ally fair annuities were available, the authors calculated for each family
the lifetime consumption that could be afforded while both earners were
alive and the lifetime consumption that could be afforded if one earner
died.
The authors made a conservative assumption that a surviving
spouse would need 50 percent of the previous affordable consumption
to maintain the accustomed living scale if one spouse died; if a family
had made provisions for less than 70 percent of this, the family was
defined to be underinsured. Auerbach and Kotlikoff conclude that just
over 30 percent of families are inadequately insured; for lower-income
households the underinsured fraction is almost one-half. From this they
conclude that the high incidence of poverty among widows is not
merely an extension of lifetime poverty but a matter of insufficient
insurance. A similar conclusion was reached by Myers, Burkhauser and
Holden (1986).
Government Policies toward Life Insurance Companies
In the light of these special market features, this paper addresses
four broad types of government policy toward life insurance companies:
reserve regulation, investment restrictions, solvency guarantees and
other consumer protections, and purchase inducements. To a large
extent, the policies are interrelated; the implications of these interrela-
tionships are discussed in the final section.
Reserve regulation. State insurance regulation requires that life com-
panies be solvent after deliberate overstatement of liabilities. It is fairly
obvious that, looking backward, a state of insolvency could be attributed
to having charged too little for the service provided and/or having
dissipated the receipts before rendering the service. Reserve regulation
addresses both problems by requiring that life companies have at all
times enough book assets to cover future death benefits on all policies,
assuming that mortality is less favorable than the most likely level and
that interest earnings on assets are lower than the most likely level. In
addition, expenses of acquiring the business (commissions) must be
deducted immediately rather than amortized over the life of the policy.
Because of the conservative position that states have taken with
respect to acquisition costs, a new company that rapidly expands its life
insurance business will have a poor balance sheet. It is standard practice
within the industry for a growing company with a critically poor balance
sheet situation to seek "surplus relief" through reinsurance. Such aPUBLIC POLICY AND LIFE INSURANCE 207
company has a group of assets--life insurance policies that it has
issued--worth more than a state insurance commission will recognize.
The issuing company can circumvent conservative accounting rules by
selling policies to a reinsurer.
In the 1960s and 1970s, reserves for life insurance companies as a
whole were conservative and capital was underestimated. One clear
indication of this was an excess of market value over book value during
this period (Belth 1967b). Those were decades of steadily increasing
interest rates, resulting in reserve interest rates chronically below
market rates. However, it appears that book and market rates in the late
1980s were much closer for life insurance companies (Kramer 1990, p.
27). Required reserves appear to be more realistic as well.
What about the quantitative aspect of reserve regulation? Do
reserves need to be so large? Do the underlying assumptions have to be
conservative? Most countries have such rules but they vary in specificity
from the mere requirement of actuarial certification in the United
Kingdom to the highly specific rules in Germany.3 Despite the variation
in reserve regulation, little difference has been found in the experience
of insolvencies (Finsinger and Pauly 1986).
In 1977, Canada terminated its previous strict reserve requirements
in favor of the British system of allowing companies some flexibility,
subject to approval by an independent actuarial audit. Mathewson and
Winter (1986) have studied the movement of life insurance prices in
Canada in relation to interest rates both before and after reserve
requirements were deregulated. Although it is not clear just how much
conservative reserve requirements protected consumers, the authors
concluded that the rigid reserve rules did tend to result in higher prices
for life insurance. The results, however, were barely significant.
Investment restrictions. These restrictions limit life insurance compa-
nies to relatively risk-free investments and presumably make it unnec-
essary for the consumer to evaluate the riskiness of the company’s
investment portfolio. Sometimes they also preclude financial innova-
tions such as junk bonds. Even before the advent of junk bonds,
however, investment restrictions created problems because a "conserv-
ative" investment policy does not protect policyholders against inflation
risk or the solvency problems that can arise when interest rates increase
with inflation and policyholders withdraw funds.
In recent years developments toward incorporating more risky
investments into the insurance framework have emerged. One tech-
nique is the variable policy, in which the savings element is invested in
a segregated set of equities with the value of the savings element
3 For more information on the British and Canadian systems, see Sondergeld (1989)
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indexed to the value of the equities. This form has been very popular in
the annuity field, especially for pension plans, but in the life field,
separate account policies remain experimental. Another variant is the
universal life form, where the savings element is clearly demarcated and
the yield on savings can be linked to a specific market indicator, such as
the T-bill rate. It seems eminently sensible that life insurance savings
should have a range of possible investments, relying on financial
markets to adjust the return to the risk. Returns and associated risks
should be clearly demarcated so that the investors making the risk
choice participate in resulting gains and losses.
The experience with sharply fluctuating interest rates in the past 30
years has led to the virtual disappearance of the old, nonparticipating
policy under which the insurance carrier was insuring a minimum rate
of return as well as against mortality. The two major interest-sensitive
products are the participating policy--the typical mutual policy--and
variants of the universal life policy sold by stock companies. The two
reflect interest rate changes differently. The participating policy is
compelled by regulation to spread interest earnings evenly over all
policyholders, old and new. Under the universal life form, which clearly
delineates the insurance and savings components of a policy, a cohort of
new policyholders can be assured a current earning rate on the savings
component; old policyholders experience current rates only as their old
investments mature. In a period of rising interest rates the universal life
form offers obvious advantages in attracting new policyholders, and
many mutuals have formed stock subsidiaries to sell universal life in
recent years.
Solvency guarantees. State regulators can intervene in the affairs of a
nearly insolvent company and, if necessary, can impose levies on other
life companies to cover the deficiencies of the insolvent company. These
levies are sometimes credited against premium taxes so that, effectively,
state funds are used for guarantees. From 1975 through 1989, the state
guaranty fund system has resulted in assessments of $315 million for
health insurance, $125 million for life insurance, and $124 millon for
annuity contracts (ACLI Task Force 1990). Only $62 million of the
Baldwin United losses were covered by state guaranty funds. The
remaining losses were covered by advances of about $150 million from
brokers (under threat of litigation) and $50 million from life insurance
companies (in addition to guaranty fund assessments).
Some observers predict growing insolvencies in the future (Leary
1991), and the collapse of First Executive has caused some alarm. But
solvency problems in the life business are clearly not in the same league
as the solvency problems of banks and thrifts. Some insurers have a
high percentage of junk bond holdings, but overall, bond default rates
have remained low (Sutton 1991). Total life insurance insolvencies,
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company capital and surplus in 1989. On the basis of a detailed review
of financial indicators, a study commissioned by the Insurance Informa-
tion Institute (Kramer 1990) concludes that in the life insurance industry,
"trends that raised risk levels earlier in the 1980s have reversed
themselves by the end of the decade." Kramer also concludes that the
capital position of the weakest life insurance companies is far stronger
than the capital position of the weakest banks and that it is "analytically
bankrupt" to compare thrifts and insurers.
Other consumer protections. A traditional area of consumer protection
has been the standardizing of policy forms and language. This is a
long-standing issue in life insurance but it is an emerging problem for
long-term care insurance. Given the growing cost of Medicaid, which
now pays for one-half of nursing home costs in the United States, the
regulation of long-term care policies is an important public policy issue.
A well-designed long-term care policy appears economically feasi-
ble (Friedland 1990). The major problem is that the insurable event is not
well defined because the medical indications for nursing home care are
not clearly established. A number of insurance policies are available but
much unhappiness exists with both the exact coverage and the level of
consumer understanding. The lack of definition in long-term care
insurance can work both ways, to harm particular customers or to
endanger the solvency of the insurance company. Earl Pomeroy, past
president of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
claims that "some consumer abuses are so severe as to raise questions
about the very viability of the product." (Consumer Union 1991.) Some
insolvencies have even occurred because of long-term care liabilities. No
real alternative to welfare will be available for most nursing home care
until a fairly clear insurable event with a calculable probability has been
defined for long-term care insurance.
Although premium rates are regulated in the health insurance
business, most states do not regulate life insurance premiums, relying
on reserve requirements to ensure adequate rates and competition to
prevent excessive rates. In addition, states routinely regulate policy
forms to ensure full disclosure.
Some regulations seem to be more in the interests of agents than
policyholders. All states forbid "twisting," where, allegedly, the policy-
holder is encouraged through misleading information to switch policies.
Price competition through rebates of commissions is also outlawed in
most states.
A few states have passed laws prohibiting certain rate differentials
such as those based on sex. These laws are unlikely to survive because
of the distortions that they create, not the least of which is above-market
rates for some groups. After Montana passed the first unisex insurance
law in 1983, lawmakers were inundated with complaints from parents of
daughters whose car insurance rates soared.210 Gerard M. Brannon
The Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is
the major form of consumer protection in the pension business. The
impact of ERISA falls mostly on employers rather than on financial
intermediaries because the most restrictive pension regulations are
those designed to make sure that pension tax benefits are distributed
equally among workers in a firm. Employers have been forced to
redesign their pension plans several times in the last decade because of
these regulations (Utgoff 1990).
Pensions are also subject to minimum vesting, funding, and diver-
sification rules under ERISA. In addition, ERISA established an insur-
ance program for defined benefit pensions. The Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation (PBGC), the federal agency that runs this guarantee
program, has experienced claims far in excess of original projections and
the agency has had solvency problems virtually since inception (Ippolito
1989).
As guarantors of pension annuities, the PBGC and state solvency
funds are competitors. When a company purchases an irrevocable contract
for an annuity to cover pension liabilities, those liabilities shift from PBGC
coverage to coverage under a state guaranty fund.
This situation has raised a number of concerns, particularly in light
of the pension annuities sold by First Executive. The workers covered by
these annuities had no say in the selection of the insurer, while the
companies that sponsored the pension plan gained because of the high
interest rates that attracted customers to First Executive. The federal
government is considering a standard that would prohibit the purchase
of annuities from unacceptable insurers. The design of such a standard
has proved .difficult, however, given that First Executive subsidiaries
were highly rated until recently. The insurance commission in California
wants the PBGC to make up for any shortfall in First Executive pension
annuities. It is clear, however, that such an action would be the
equivalent ~f a federal guarantee of life insurance companies, a highly
questionable move in light of the record of other federal guarantee
programs.
Unisex pensions are required by law. After the 1983 Supreme Court
decision in Norris v. Arizona Commissioner, monthly pension annuities
could not reflect longevity differences between men and women.
Sex-based actuarial tables for pensions are an illegal form of sex
discrimination. Carlson and Lord (1986) describe the predictable prob-
lems that this ruling has created.
Purchase inducements. The assertion that life insurance is under-
purchased can~be used to justify purchase inducements, which can
range from the social provision of life insurance to a subsidy for private
purchases. Federal law contains several provisions that are designed to
increase insurance coverage. The survivor benefit structure of Social
Security is compulsory life insurance. In addition, pension plans arePUBLIC POLICY AND LIFE INSURANCE 211
required to provide survivor benefits for spouses of vested participants.
The federal tax code is used to provide significant purchase subsidies as
well. A subsidy that is restricted to employed individuals provides for
an exclusion from income of employer-paid group term insurance up to
$50,000 of coverage. All policyholders are entitled to the tax-free inside
buildup that is provided for cash value insurance.
The life insurance industry uses the argument that consumers
under-purchase life insurance in order to justify retaining the tax
advantage for life insurance contained in the tax-free inside buildup, the
interest on the reserve accumulation. But this tax advantage subsidizes
savings, not insurance against the death of a breadwinner. If an
individual buys term insurance and separately accumulates savings in a
bank account or a mutual fund, the interest on the savings is taxed
annually as income of the saver, and no deduction is allowed for the
term insurance premiums. If the savings are used instead to purchase
permanent insurance, the interest is not subject to income tax if it
becomes part of the death distribution or if it is used to pay for the
insurance premium. The interest beyond that used to pay for term
insurance may be taxed if the policy is surrendered, but only after
considerable delay. The Treasury Tax Reform Plans I and II in 1984-85
recommended repeal of the inside buildup advantages, as well as repeal
of the deferral possibilities in deferred annuities (U.S. Treasury 1984).
These were largely rejected by the Congress.
The effort to subsidize life insurance purchases through the encour-
agement of savings-type life insurance makes it more difficult to guar-
antee the solvency of life companies. If we are highly concerned that
dependents of breadwinners not be left without resources, the approach
should be to encourage the purchase of term life insurance and to
guarantee the ability of insurance companies to fulfillterm life insurance
contracts.
When the insurer is simultaneously a savings institution subject to
investment risks, it becomes difficult to separate a guarantee of the
insurance function from a guarantee of the investment function, al-
though the case for protecting widows and orphans is clearly different
from that for protecting savers in general.
The tax law also complicates solvency problems by offering the tax
advantage of postponed income recognition for annuities, even for
annuities certain. The postponement of income recognition until, receipt
appears reasonable in the case of life annuities that are in the payment
stage. The taxpayer has accepted income postponement as a way of
leveling receipts over the remaining lifetime and government should do
likewise. Before the payment stage, however, the current taxation of
investment income would be more consistent with the taxation of other
types of savings that are not tax-preferred, namely savings in depository
institutions and mutual funds.212 Gerard M. Brannon
The tax law subsidizes not only the purchase of insurance but also
the purchase of insurance from small companies. It is clear from the
simple statistics of large numbers that small life insurance companies are
inherently more prone to solvency problems, and consequently less
efficient (Geehan 1977). In the regular corporate income tax, a small
company is given a rate reduction that reaches a top value of $11,750 at
incomes between $75,000 and $100,000 and is then phased out up to an
income of $335,000. For a small life insurance company additional relief
peaks at $612,000 (at an income of $3 million) and does not phase out
entirely until income is $5 million. The small life insurance company has
50 times as much relief as any other small company.
Tax scholars are unanimous that no basis exists for progressivity in
the general corporate tax and even less of a case exists for small
insurance companies because of their inherent inefficiencies in provid-
ing risk coverage. The small business provision in insurance tax law can
only be described as misguided.
Overview and Conclusions
Government intervention in the life insurance industry is found in
four major areas: reserve regulation, consumer protection, solvency
guarantees, and purchase inducements in the form of tax benefits. Any
evaluation of these policies must recognize that life insurance companies
offer some products, such as pensions and health insurance, that are
also sold by other financial intermediaries, and that the unique product
of the industry--term life insurance--is often combined in a single
product with tax-favored savings.
The most long-standing government policy toward life insurance is
reserve regulation, including the control of investment quality. This
policy appears to have been reasonably successful in achieving its
announced purpose, consumer protection. Until recently, the solvency
record of the industry has been remarkably good. This has not been
achieved without cost, however. The investment restrictions have
reduced the yield on savings and the price of life insurance has probably
been kept a bit higher.
Other consumer protection efforts beyond reserve regulation are
more difficult to evaluate. While some observers have complained that
state governments have moved too slowly to make consumers aware of
interest and time value in life insurance, the increased popularity of
term life and universal life policies indicates that awareness has blos-
somed. The current battlefront over disclosure is long-term care. In this
new and changing market it is not surprising to find efforts to provide
insurance or to find that the existence of insurance changes behavior.PUBLIC POLICY AND LIFE INSURANCE 213
Nor is it surprising that companies will try to limit their exposure in
ways that are not always transparent to consumers.
State solvency guarantees can be characterized as evolutionary
products of healthy experimentation, with much input from the life
companies concerned about the product image. Until recently, solvency
problems have been minor. Some of these insolvencies can be blamed
on the federal tax subsidy that results in increased numbers of small life
insurance companies, because small companies inherently are more
susceptible to failure.
We should expect a solvency guarantee program to be successful so
long as it is limited to insurance contracts as opposed to investment
vehicles. Term insurance alone requires limited reserves. Unanticipated
changes in mortality do not appear to be a big financial threat for life
insurance companies.
The state solvency guarantee policy may well be at a crossroad. As
interest rates rose in the 1970s, the conservative orientation of insurance
regulation began to chafe. One effect of increased interest rates was
disintermediation, a familiar term to banking experts. The industry
survived this fairly well, in part by offering new interest-sensitive
products. The obvious dangers, however, appear when firms compete
for investors based on returns. Many of the financial problems in the life
insurance industry seem to be related to risky investments undertaken
because of the pressure to guarantee high returns.
The state solvency guarantee programs should move in the direc-
tion of guaranteeing plain vanilla life insurance, which includes mini-
mum guaranteed returns; speculative investment products should not
be guaranteed. If a willing borrower and a willing lender agree to a
product with an 8 percent yield guarantee, they should be free to do so,
but no good reason exists to provide a solvency guarantee for this
feature, even if the product is called life insurance. Similarly, a financial
intermediary should be able to offer an investment with the return based
on the yields of rates of junk bonds, even if this investment is in the
form of an annuity or a life insurance policy. Since the extra return is
based on extra risk, a guarantee is difficult to justify. No guarantee
should be given on a pure savings contract.4
While a guarantee feature does attract investors, the life insurance
industry probably could also attract funds to a non-guaranteed vehicle
that would not be hobbled by the investment restrictions that a guaran-
tee requires. Non-guaranteed mutual funds have prospered, while
banks and thrifts that enjoy almost unlimited coverage have struggled.
The conclusions regarding the tax treatment of insurance are mixed.
4 I am indebted to Warren Wise for clarifying my thinking on this point. He may not
agree with the conclusion, however.214 Gerard M. Brannon
It appears that underinvestment in life insurance is a problem, particu-
larly in low-income families. But the employer-paid group insurance
subsidy is unlikely to get to the lowest-income workers, who are even
less likely to receive any fringe benefits. The inside buildup tax exemp-
tion for policies that contain investments is also of little use to low-
income workers.
What makes a judgment on inside buildup difficult is the erratic
structure of the present U.S. income tax. Before 1986 much academic
literature was written about our hybrid tax system--half an income tax
and half a consumption tax. The Reagan tax reform effort in 1985-86 was
a conscious movement toward a purer income tax. Since that time, the
Congress has shown only a limited interest in a purer income tax and
currently both the Administration and important segments of the
Congress are vying to move back toward a consumption tax, with
proposed capital gains relief, expanded IRAs, and Family Savings Plans.
Some very large segments of the savings flow in the United States
are subjected to consumption tax treatment: pension savings, home
equity, and savings invested in municipal bonds. One big savings flow
that is denied consumption tax treatment is bank deposits. But bank
deposits get an alternative subsidy in the form of a guarantee that is
comparable to the tax exemption for the inside buildup.
Direct investment in a business through stocks, bonds, and most
mutual funds does not get consumption tax treatment or a subsidized
guarantee. Although much of the concern from the early 1980s about a
hybrid tax system is still well taken, it is not clear whether we should
resume the aborted march to a pure income tax or move to a consump-
tion tax. Reasonable people disagree on this.
A great deal of effort has been devoted, over the past decade, to
defining components of life insurance contracts that are ineligible for
favorable tax treatment because they are deemed to be investment
products rather than insurance. It is not clear how necessary this
exercise has been to the achievement of a desirable tax system. Many
other forms of savings that could be classified as investments are tax
favored. Moreover, life insurance companies do not appear to be
cornering the savings market through savings disguised as life insur-
ance products; life insurance reserves are stagnant; the share of house-
hold savings accounted for by life insurance has declined; and consum-
ers are increasingly purchasing term insurance which benefits little, or
not at all, from the inside buildup. It is also not clear that a tax on the
inside buildup would have resulted in a lower deficit, even in the near
term. It could easily be argued that a tax incentive that kept funds out of
banks and thrifts was a net benefit to taxpayers.
While it is not clear that the IRS should be working diligently to
distinguish between investment products and insurance products, this
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funds. As long as investment (savings) products are guaranteed, insol-
vencies will continue to occur because reserve regulations and invest-
ment decisions cannot anticipate every financial innovation. Moreover,
entrepreneurs who see these innovations as opportunities rather than
abuses of the guarantee system will always be present.
The conventional wisdom in the insurance industry and in Wash-
ington appears to be that a satisfactory resolution of the First Executive
failure depends on full restoration of contractually promised benefits to
all policyholders. Full restoration is believed to be necessary in order to
head off intrusive and damaging federal regulation of the industry. But
this line of reasoning is flawed. A policy of full protection of all
contractual obligations will result in the same dynamics that have
plagued banks and thrifts--mounting insolvencies, high premiums, and
increased capital requirements.
The mutual fund industry is a better model for financial regulators
than either the banking or the thrift industry.216 Gerard M. Brannon
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Joseph M. Belth*
Gerard Brannon’s paper is provocative because it discusses a
number of controversial topics. I will comment on only one--federal
income taxation of the inside interest--although my comments neces~
sarily will touch on other aspects of Brannon’s paper. I will break the
topic into two parts, the first dealing with cash-value life insurance and
the second dealing with the accumulation period in life annuities.
Life Insurance
Life insurance, or what Brannon corrrectly observes should be
called "death insurance," performs important functions. It allows an
individual to protect dependents against the individual’s death when
the individual’s resources are insufficient to meet his or her objectives
for those dependents. Possible illegal methods for handling that insuf-
ficiency include robbing a bank, printing money, and insider trading,
but life insurance is the only legal method.
Unfortunately, this useful financial arrangement suffers from two
related and potentially fatal flaws. Life insurance deals with a subject the
individual finds unpleasant--namely, the individual’s death. Under
these circumstances, the human tendency is to postpone discussion of
the individual’s needs for life insurance, and therefore to postpone its
purchase. Consequently, life insurance must be marketed aggressively.
What I call the anti-procrastination function is performed by life
*Professor of Insurance in the School of Business at Indiana University (Bloomington)
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insurance agents. The only effective way to motivate agents to perform
that function is to compensate them through substantial commissions,
most of which are paid at the time of sale. Without substantial compen-
sation, the anti-procrastination function will not be performed and the
amount of life insurance purchased by individuals will be small.
The second potentially fatal flaw is the shape of the curve repre-
senting the probabilities of death by age. In the early years, probabilities
of death are low. The probabilities increase with advancing age, and in
the later years they increase rapidly. Natural premiums for life insur-
ance, therefore, are small in the early years of age, increase with
advancing age, and in the later years increase rapidly.
The shape of the curve is a problem for two reasons. First, the low
probabilities mean that gross premiums derived from natural premiums
tend to be small in the early policy years. Thus, the insurance company
does not receive enough premium revenue in the early policy years to
compensate agents adequately for performing the anti-procrastination
function.
Second, the rapid increase in probabilities of death in the later years
produces adverse selection; that is, as gross premiums derived from
natural premiums increase rapidly, the relatively healthy members of
the insured group tend to drop out, leaving only the relatively un-
healthy members still insured. Thus, the quality of the remaining group
of insured individuals tends to deteriorate more rapidly than it would
from the mere aging of the group.
Level-premium, cash-value life insurance represents an effort to
deal with both of these problems. The higher premiums in the early
policy years provide the insurance company with more revenue to
compensate agents for performing the anti-procrastination function.
Also, the level premiums reduce the amount of adverse selection
because policyowners are not faced with rapidly increasing premiums.
Level premiums, however, do not solve the underlying problems..
When it is suggested that the amount of the agent’s commission or the
size of the front-end load be disclosed to the consumer, life insurance
companies and agents oppose such proposals vigorously. They are
probably right when they say such disclosure would be an impediment
to the sales process.
Also, level premiums do not level out the price of the life insurance
protection. If policyowners were informed of the yearly prices per $1,000
of protection, which tend to increase with advancing age, adverse
selection would occur just as it does in the case of gross premiums
derived from natural premiums. Proposals to disclose yearly prices per
$1,000 of protection are also opposed vigorously by the life insurance
industry.
In short, level-premium, cash-value life insurance represents an
effort to overcome two potentially fatal flaws. The effort has been220 Joseph M. Belth
successful because the life insurance industry has been able to avoid
disclosing vital information to policyowners and prospective policyown-
ers. In addition, many deceptive sales techniques are widely used, but
that subject is beyond the scope of this discussion.
Level premiums give rise to the savings component of life insur-
ance. The federal income taxation of the inside interest in cash-value life
insurance is generally deferred until the policy terminates, and then the
inside interest is either fully or partially exempt, depending upon the
circumstances surrounding termination.
Life Annuities
A life annuity is an arrangement under which the annuitant
receives periodic payments, usually monthly, as long as the annuitant
lives. The arrangement may or may not involve a minimum number of
payments in the event of the annuitant’s early death. The idea of a life
annuity is to exhaust a principal sum, together with interest, over an
individual’s lifetime. Brannon correctly describes the arrangement as
"insurance against living too long."
Life annuities make sense only when interest rates are low. In that
situation, interest payments alone generally do not provide adequate
income for the annuitant, and invasion of the principal usually is
necessary. The only way to invade the principal and be certain not to
exhaust the principal before the annuitant dies is to utilize a life annuity.
When interest rates are high, interest payments on a given amount
of principal may be almost as large as life annuity payments derived
from the same amount of principal. It makes little sense to use a life
annuity that exhausts principal when it is possible to obtain similar
interest payments and preserve the principal.
Thus far I have been referring to the liquidation period of a life
annuity. A life annuity may have a lengthy accumulation period, either
because it is purchased through installment premiums, or because it is
purchased with a single premium paid many years before the beginning
of the liquidation period.
Federal income taxation of the inside interest during the accumula-
tion period of a life annuity is generally deferred until the annuity is
surrendered or until the liquidation period begins. This favorable tax
treatment has led to the widespread use of life annuities even where the
purchaser has no desire to use the life annuity to liquidate principal and
interest over the lifetime of the annuitant. Indeed, life annuities gener-
ally are not needed in today’s relatively high-interest environment.DISCUSSION 22!
Conclusion
The favorable federal income tax treatment of the inside interest in
cash-value life insurance and in the accumulation period of life annuities
may at one time have been justified, because it was considered socially
desirable to encourage the purchase of substantial amounts of life
insurance for the financial protection of dependents and the purchase of
substantial amounts of life annuities for retirement purposes. It may also
have been justified on administrative grounds, because it would have
been difficult to establish systems to tax the inside interest currently.
Today these justifications are being weakened. With regard to the
social arguments, fewer and fewer individuals are purchasing larger and
larger amounts of cash-value life insurance, so that the favorable income
tax treatment of the inside interest is increasingly a benefit for individ-
uals with high incomes. As for life annuities, they are being used
increasingly by individuals solely because of tax considerations. The
administrative arguments against current taxation of the inside interest
are also weaker because of modern computer technology.
Two powerful arguments remain for continuing the favorable
federal income tax treatment of the inside interest. Although the life
insurance companies’ share of the savings dollar is declining, life
insurance companies remain important financial institutions. I believe
that current taxation of the inside interest would have a devastating
impact on the life insurance industry and would threaten its very
survival. I question whether it would be sound tax and economic policy
to take such a step, even though it may be justified on theoretical
grounds.
The second argument is purely political. Current taxation of the
inside interest is so controversial, and the political power of the life
insurance industry is so broadly based, that any elected representative
would be committing political suicide to support the idea. I cannot
believe that Congress would vote to impose current income taxation on
the inside interest, thereby producing a relatively modest amount of
revenue, in the face of ferocious opposition by the life insurance
industry.Discussion
Earl R. Pomeroy*
The insurance regulator’s role is a particularly difficult one. An
insurance regulator stands in the cross fire of the market economists and
portions of the insurance industry who decry regulatory intervention
and resulting disruption of free market forces, and consumers and
legislators who berate regulators for inactivity whenever circumstances
suggest that existing regulatory provisions are not always adequate.
Gerard Brannon has presented a substantive and thought-provok-
ing paper. In particular, I shall comment on the four broad types of
governmental intervention in the insurance industry, as outlined in the
paper: reserve regulation, consumer protection, solvency guarantees,
and tax policy. The concluding section will offer some observations on
the existing regulatory structure of the insurance industry in light of the
proposal for a new federal role relative to the industry.
Reserve Regulation of Life Insurance
The life insurance industry today has lower capitalization levels,
slimmer profit margins, and higher risks on its investment portfolio than
it did 10 years ago. These factors have provoked a regulatory response
that has improved the sophistication of regulatory oversight, while
increasing the breadth of regulatory strictures on the calculation and
management of reserves by the life insurance industry. Insurance
commissioners increased regulatory intervention in response to the
characteristics of the marketplace that have made solvency policing a
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significant concern. In this respect, insurance regulation has rejected the
economic theory that this financial services industry is best left to its
own devices, as companies are ultimately answerable to the undeniable
laws of the unfettered free marketplace.
More specifically, regulatory strategies for greater oversight of
reserve regulation have included building a greater sophistication into
the bond evaluation system used by the Securities Valuation Office
while incorporating higher reserve requirements for the lower grada-
tions of bond investments. In addition, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has recently adopted a model law
that imposes restrictions on concentrations of lower-quality bonds.
Generally, these restrictions limit "junk bond" holdings to 20 percent
of a company’s assets, with tighter restrictions specifically applicable
to the lowest bond classifications. The Insurance Commissioners are
now developing reserve requirements for real estate and other assets, as
well as limitations on concentrations of identified higher risk invest-
ments.
A consequence of this regulatory activity will be lower investment
returns to insurance companies and lower investment returns and
higher premium prices to consumers. Another consequence will be the
restriction of capital formerly available to certain types of economic
activity. In light of the fact that the regulator’s highest priority is
solvency protection, however, the reserve regulation initiatives are
important and wholly appropriate. 1
Consumer Protection
The initial thrust of regulatory intervention in the marketplace in
order to address consumer protection came in requiring certain disclo-
sures to consumers. The rationale underlying this action was that in
light of the intangible character of insurance products, consumers were
entitled to specific information in order to make prudent choices.
As time has passed, however, the insurance policies offered have
grown in complexity while the regulatory structure has grown in
sophistication. It has become apparent that regulation aimed merely at
informing consumers is not sufficient and more aggressive regulation is
required. For many years now, insurance regulation has been directed at
dictating minimum product quality for various types of insurance
1 Further enhancing all of this effort will be improved benchmarks for evaluating the
adequacy of insurance company reserves, through the development of risk-based reserv-
ing principles. The NAIC activity in this area has been led by Terence Lennon of the New
York State Insurance Department, who deserves a great deal of credit for the leadership he
has provided to the nation°s insurance regulators in this area.224 Earl R. Pomeroy
policies. In terms of a free market analysis, this regulatory action
restricts consumer choices, albeit for the purpose of ridding the market
of consumer alternatives that do not represent a "good buy" under
nearly any circumstance.
A case in point is raised in Brannon’s paper concerning long-term
care insurance. In recent years, regulators have moved to prohibit
certain policy limitations that insurance companies have used to limit
payment of benefits. While these moves have dramatically improved
product quality, they have also increased the claims cost likely to be
experienced by the insurance industry on these products. As a result,
premium prices have increased.
Many of the health insurance products, including long-term care
insurance, face active congressional oversight and intervention. I believe
this is especially the case with health insurance over other lines of
insurance because health insurance coverage .directly involves social
policy issues, and Congress has not had sufficient funds to deal directly
with the problems arising in health care financing. Some members of
Congress seem to go by the maxim, "When one cannot appropriate, the
next best thing is to regulate."
Congress tends to be more interventionist in the consumer protec-
tion area than insurance regulators, for several reasons. The first is
philosophical: while regulators are accustomed to regulating the indus-
try itself, the breadth of congressional legislative authority leaves them
much more accustomed to attempting to achieve social goals through
the imposition of market restrictions. Perhaps another reason can be
attributed to the necessarily more general analysis given to the insur-
ance industry by members of Congress as opposed to insurance regu-
lators. The interplay of market forces may be less clearly understood by
legislators, given the infinite variety of issues with which they must
deal. An example is again afforded by long-term care insurance. Present
congressional proposals would specifically require two features in every
policy--inflation protection and nonforfeiture values. While without
question these features enhance product quality, requiring their inclu-
sion in each policy sold will dramatically increase premium prices and
make this estate protection policy unaffordable to a portion of the
market. Another example of the level of intervention Congress is
comfortable in mandating can be found in Medicare supplement insur-
ance. In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 Congress
established a mandate that no more than 10 variations of insurance
policies will be allowed in this market (unless a policy is specifically
authorized as containing an "innovative benefit").DISCUSSION 225
Solvency Guarantees
Brannon’s paper suggests that the costs of solvency guarantees
should fall entirely upon the financial services industry that is under-
written. As an individual regulator, I wholeheartedly agree with this
assertion. As noted in Brannon’s paper, unfortunately this is not the
case for the savings and loan industry nor for the banking industry, nor
as a general matter is it true for the life insurance industry. Most of the
states with life and health guaranty funds offer a tax credit that
effectively reduces an insurance company’s premium tax obligation to a
state by the amount of assessments it pays into the guaranty fund.
Accordingly, in reality, life guaranty funds ultimately represent a state
taxpayer assessment, not an insurance company assessment.
Brannon correctly asserts a marketplace danger of guaranty funds.
By guaranteeing all policies, market forces encouraging sound solvency
management practices--including high capitalization and low-risk prod-
ucts--compare unfavorably to higher-risk products written by compa-
nies having thin levels of capitalization.
While regulators acknowledge that solvency guarantees through
insurance guaranty funds may have the effect of dulling consumer
sensitivity in this area, clearly guaranty funds serve a critical role in the
insurance market today. Regulators have tried to minimize the down-
side consequences of guaranty funds by restricting agents from touting
the existence of the insurance guaranty funds while soliciting the sale of
insurance products. In North Dakota, for example, an agent may not
discuss the guaranty fund until notification is provided with the delivery
of the insurance policy--well after the application has been submitted to
the insurance company.
An issue exists today as to whether guaranty funds will have
adequate capacity to cover policyholder obligations in light of either the
failure of an extremely large life insurer or in the event of a rash of
several life insurance insolvencies. Guaranty fund capacity is deter-
mined by an assessment limitation, based upon the amount of premi-
ums written by insurance companies in a state in a given year (usually
2 percent of premium writings). In light of recent hearings the NAIC has
held on this subject, I am reasonably hopeful that the guaranty fund
mechanism does have sufficient capacity on a state-by-state basis, even
in light of the regulatory action taken against Executive Life Insurance
Company.
In this specific instance, I commend Commissioner John Garamendi
of California for his careful handling to date of this terribly complex
insolvency. In the event a course of liquidation had immediately been
embarked upon, given the virtually illiquid condition of many of the
junk bond assets held in the Executive Life investment portfolio, a
significant shortfall would have resulted that probably would have226 Earl R. Pomeroy
exceeded the reach of the insurance guaranty fund. I am hopeful the
course the California Insurance Department has set upon, including the
solicitation of contributions from other interested parties, will provide
the policyholders with substantially the benefits of their contracts,
without busting guaranty fund capacity throughout the country.
Tax Policy
Expertise as an insurance regulator has not afforded me particular
expertise regarding the tax policy issues presented by the current
insurance industry tax structure. However, I have some general obser-
vations.
First, Brannon’s paper offers useful comments on the significant tax
subsidy now provided in support of the present employer-based health
insurance system. While this policy has historically been extremely
successful at obtaining insurance coverage for most Americans through
employer-based health insurance plans, obviously further governmental
intervention will be required in the not-so-distant future, in light of the
chronic difficulties of crisis proportions now existing in this line of
insurance. The significant tax subsidy that has been available for
employer-based health insurance would seem to provide considerable
basis for additional government initiatives, aimed at cost and coverage
issues, in the employer-based health insurance system.
A second issue on tax policy involves solvency. Dramatic changes in
tax policy have the potential to cause significant consequences in the
insurance marketplace. It is likely that aggressive tax policy changes
would have a detrimental impact on company surplus positions and
could cause difficulty to the most thinly capitalized companies. I do not
offer this as a reason not to address inequities in the present tax
structure, but rather as a word of caution. Significant changes in tax
policy should be implemented on a phased-in basis after ample notice
and lead time have been afforded, in order to avoid causing failures of
insurance companies that have not had a chance to prepare for these
changes.
Implicit Strengths in the Existing Regulatory Structure
State insurance regulation came into being in the mid 1800s when
the character of the insurance industry was quite different and federal
government activity significantly more limited. However, this does not
mean that the existing structure is irrelevant to the challenges of
regulating today’s insurance industry.
State insurance regulation has had an evolutionary character which,DISCUSSION 227
generally speaking, has allowed states to successfully perform their
regulatory responsibilities. For example, recognizing the need for inter-
state coordination of insurance regulatory activities, the Insurance
Commissioners formed the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners in 1871. Four years later they developed the forerunner of a
uniform financial statement that provides for uniform insurance ac-
counting methods for all companies, regardless of their state of domi-
cile. In 1909, they established the Securities Valuation Office for the
purpose of implementing a uniform valuation of bonds held by insur-
ance companies. In the 1930s, multistate financial examinations were
begun in recognition of the fact that companies were often doing
business across state lines. In the 1970s, the NAIC established a series of
solvency evaluation tests which were run on the financial statements of
all companies filing with the NAIC.
The state regulatory system has undertaken more dramatic steps in
recent years to stay abreast of an industry that has grown significantly
more complex over the past 10 to 15 years. Nationwide regulatory
changes have been implemented through the use of four strategies,
based upon unique attributes of the existing regulatory structure.
First, additional requirements have been added to the financial
statements required of all insurance companies. Actuarial verification of
loss reserves and CPA audits were implemented throughout the regu-
latory system by incorporating these requirements into the Annual
Statements in 1990.
Secondly, the NAIC presently has an annual budget in excess of $15
million and a staff of 155 for the purpose of supporting the more than
8,100 men and women involved in insurance regulation throughout the
state insurance departments. The staff and budget have more than
doubled since 1987, reflecting general recognition that greater support
services from the NAIC would be an important aspect of improving the
regulation of this industry.
Thirdly, regulators have implemented a system of peer review,
wherein the performance of departments vis-a-vis financially troubled
companies is monitored and evaluated on an ongoing basis. In the event
a domestic state refuses to take required action on a financially troubled
company, other state regulators are prepared to initiate the activities
required for the protection of policyholders throughout the nation.
Finally, and most importantly, the NAIC has taken the historic step
of adopting minimum standards for the regulation of solvency. The
standards were enacted in 1989, and in 1990 an audit mechanism was
established for the purpose of verifying state compliance with the
minimum standards. To date, four states have passed an audit review
and have been certified. States have a particularly strong incentive to
obtain certified status, in light of the additional regulatory requirements
that will apply to domestic companies of noncertified states, beginning228 Earl R. Pomeroy
in 1994. States not meeting compliance standards may face the prospect
of the redomestication of their insurance companies, because of the
imposition of further regulatory burdens on their companies’ ability to
transact interstate business. This incentive to obtain certification appears
to have been very successful during the 1991 legislative cycle. To date,
45 states have been identified as including in their legislative proposals
the solvency regulatory bills required to obtain certification.
The U.S. insurance industry is extremely competitive, and this has
resulted in relatively extensive insurance regulation. Without question,
the United States has more insurance regulators per company than any
other country. The insolvencies occurring within the existing industry
structure are due in part to the intense competition in price and product
quality. While regulators and policymakers alike recognize the need to
reduce the number of insolvencies now and in the future, it is unlikely
that consumers will stand for significantly higher prices in order to
provide sufficient return to insurance companies to ensure that insol-
vencies will not occur.
Downside Consequences of Dramatic Federal
Regulatory Intervention
Insurance regulators have significant concerns regarding the future
of the insurance market in the event that sweeping new federal
regulatory proposals are passed by this Congress. Some of the reasons
for their concern are as follows.
First, the federal perception of the solvency problem appears to be
overstated. The intense level of current federal interest seems to be
driven in part by the extreme sensitivity concerning solvency caused by
the substantial number of savings and loan failures, as well as a
perception that the financial difficulty experienced by the Executive Life
Insurance Company may represent a harbinger of things to come within
the life insurance industry. In point of fact, economic analysis of the
three financial services industries reveals that insurance is substantially
different from the thrift and banking industries and is in considerably
better financial health. In addition, while Executive Life became finan-
cially imperiled in light of its reliance upon junk bonds in its investment
portfolio (69 percent of its assets were junk bonds, prior to the action
taken by the California Insurance Department), the life insurance
industry as a whole has followed a much more conservative investment
pattern. On average, only 6 percent of the assets of the insurance
industry are junk bonds.
Second, reforms of the existing structure have not been given
enough time to work. The activity of state insurance regulators in
improving oversight regarding solvency is without precedent within theDISCUSSION 229
state regulatory system. These reforms should be objectively assessed as
to whether they have sufficiently addressed the new complexities of the
insurance market. Obviously, it will be cheaper, quicker, and more cost
efficient to enhance the present regulatory structure than to scrap it for
a new and unproved system with close analogies to failed regulatory
systems. The dual regulatory structure has been recognized as playing a
prominent role in the widespread failures realized within the thrift
industry, for example.
Third, the market consequences of a federal regulatory structure
may adversely affect the insurance industry. The analysis to date of the
state regulatory system has had a tendency to note every insolvency as
a significant regulatory failure. Under this analysis, regulators are
seemingly being held to a standard of perfection. State regulators would
be the first to acknowledge that the existing structure is not perfect and
that failures will occur within the present state regulatory format. On
the other hand, however, the existing structure, with the expertise,
resources, and existing authority all located at the state level, represents
a regulatory system that will compare favorably with any federal
proposal.
Any viable federal proposal must be developed according to the
laws of least political resistance. One can anticipate that these laws will
have the following consequences.
First, state rate regulation will not be preempted. In light of the
political activity taking place at the state level relative to rate regulation,
driven by the affordability crisis in private passenger auto and health
insurance, state governments would vigorously oppose preemption of
rate regulatory authority. Any member of Congress from a large urban
district is unlikely to vote to remove from the state regulatory system the
ability to evaluate and control premium rates.
Accordingly, the industry faces the prospect of federal solvency
regulation while rate regulation continues at the state level. Over the
long haul, it would be untenable to separate rate regulation and
solvency regulation, in light of the inextricable relationship between
adequate rates and financial solvency. Having a regulatory system not
charged with the complete responsibility would increase the likelihood
that an affordability crisis driven by soaring claims costs would result in
the suppression of premium rates below levels required to maintain
financially strong companies.
Second, it is easier to add than to preempt. Accordingly, a new
federal regulatory oversight role would likely come in addition to the
existing regulatory responsibilities of the states. Portions of the insur-
ance industry looking favorably on federal regulation as a means to
avoid state regulation may find themselves sorely disappointed to find
more regulatory requirements, not less, as a consequence of some new
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proven to be the end-all of solvency regulation, as evidenced by the
other financial services industries. Insurance premium tax revenues are
critical to the budgets of state governments, which have assumed ever
greater responsibilities in recent years. I believe states would fight to the
death any proposal to preempt state premium tax collection.
Third, it is also inevitable that any new federal role be financed
entirely by the insurance industry. Given the federal budget deficit, any
federal initiative must pay its own way, and that would particularly be
the case in a regulatory undertaking of the insurance industry. Admin-
istrative costs to companies would increase in order to pay for any
additional regulatory functions.
Fourth, regulation driven by a federal system is more subject to
political manipulation nationwide than a state-by-state regulatory sys-
tem. As evidenced by the significant changes in regulatory philosophies
between recent Administrations, philosophical swings can be extremely
disruptive to the functioning of a financial services industry.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe the debate on insurance regulation will
represent a ball game with two halves. In the first half, the state
regulatory structure is competing against the concept of a perfect
regulatory system. Implicit in some of the searing criticism received to
date is the idea that a perfect structure would not have allowed these
regulatory lapses and that a federal response would be in the nature of
establishing a perfect structure. In the second half of this ball game, the
existing regulatory system will be competing against an actual federal
proposal. I expect that the evaluation of the existing system will be much
more favorable when contrasted with a concrete federal alternative
constructed along the aforesaid principles of least political resistance.Discussion
Warren R. Wise*
Gerard Brannon presents some interesting points in his paper,
"Public Policy and Life Insurance." In response, I will comment first on
his point that life insurance combines death protection and investment
of the insured’s savings. I will then address, somewhat more exten-
sively, his comments regarding the solvency problem now facing the life
insurance industry.
Policy Values
Brannon asserts that the cash value resulting from premiums paid
on permanent life insurance is equivalent to a savings account. He
denies that it is related to the protection provided by the policy. This
analysis is not entirely accurate and leads to some faulty conclusions.
The cash value accumulation in a life policy results from the leveling
of the total premium over the anticipated term of the insurance protec-
tion. Without this leveling, the premium in the later years would be
excessive. Leveling involves a modest prepayment of premiums needed
to support coverage in later years. The resulting cash value in the policy
is not a savings plan. It is simply the means of providing lifetime
protection at an acceptable price.
The assertion that permanent insurance involves a savings plan
leads to several questionable conclusions. For example, it is erroneous to
conclude that permanent insurance includes savings because the federal
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tax on these savings is less than the tax on other kinds of savings. As
explained, the cash value exists to help meet insurance costs in later
years. It does not exist because of the applicable tax treatment. In fact,
cash value life insurance existed long before the enactment of our federal
income tax law.
It also is erroneous to conclude that the tax-free inside buildup in
life insurance is a tax subsidy to savings and not a subsidy to encourage
the purchase of life insurance protection. The cash value is integral to
the death protection provided by the permanent whole life policy.
Congress gave tax-free status to the interest added to the cash value to
encourage Americans to provide adequate protection against untimely
death. The tax-free status for this interest is not intended as a stimulus
to enhanced savings.
The tax-free status of the interest added to the cash value on a
permanent life insurance policy also is consistent with the legal doctrine
of constructive receipt. Under that doctrine, income is not taxed if the
taxpayer would have to incur a substantial detriment to realize the
income. The constructive receipt doctrine applies to interest on cash
values because the policyholder would have to give up the policy or
incur some other substantial detriment to realize the interest added to
the cash value. The policyholder cannot obtain a comparable policy
without paying a new front-end sales load. If uninsurable, the policy-
holder may not be able to obtain new insurance at all. These are
substantial detriments. Congress also granted tax-free status for the
interest added to the cash value in a permanent life insurance policy
because it did not want to impose a tax on income saved instead of
consumed.
Before I discuss the solvency problem, I want to commend Brannon
for making two very important points.
Some criticize the life insurance industry because they believe the
tax-free treatment for interest added to the cash value in a life insurance
policy is an unnecessary tax subsidy. Brannon points out that other
financial institutions receive even greater subsidies from the federal
government. He notes, for example, the substantial subsidy given to
banks and thrift institutions through the federal deposit insurance
program.
Brannon also makes a telling point regarding the dramatic decline in
the amount of assets committed to life insurance. The insurance indus-
try should take note of this. The trend also is significant beyond the
insurance industry, because traditionally life insurers have been a major
source of long-term investment capital for our economy.DISCUSSION 233
The Solvency Problem
Now I would like to discuss the life insurance solvency problem.
Brannon asserts that solvency is a significant problem in the life
insurance industry today, and I agree.
The Problem
The record shows clearly that the number of life insurance compa-
nies becoming insolvent has increased significantly over the last few
years. In the 16-year period from 1975 through June 1990, 168 life
insurance companies became insolvent or impaired. From 1975 through
1982, insolvencies averaged five per year; from 1983 through 1989, the
average rose to 17 per year. In 1989, 43 insolvencies occurred, the most
in any year. Between 1975 and 1989, assessments to guaranty funds
totaled $485 million. Costs rose from $62.4 million in 1988 to $160 million
in 1989.
This trend is continuing. In 1990, over 25 percent of all life insurance
companies had four or more financial ratios outside the usual ranges.
Companies like these have historically been designated by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for immediate regula-
tory attention.
The change in the size of the companies becoming insolvent also is
significant. Not long ago most insolvent companies were small and had
only a few policyholders. Now we face the problems that arise when
major companies like First Executive and First Capital become impaired.
We also face the financial problems surrounding an insurer like Mon-
arch right here in Massachusetts.
The life insurance industry offers a unique product. It receives
money from customers today in return for an intangible promise to pay
benefits at some future date. The value of the promise depends entirely
upon the insurer’s ability to. pay. The solvency problem is truly serious
if the consumer’s financial needs are not met because the insurer fails to
meet its obligations. This is true no matter what the size of the insurer
may be. It is not an acceptable answer to say, as some do, but not
Brannon, that on the average only a few companies become insolvent
and the amount involved is comparatively insignificant. We must focus
on the plight of the insurance consumer who buys insurance but fails to
receive the promised insurance benefit.
As Brannon observes, the high interest rate environment of the late
1970s and early 1980s triggered a product revolution in the life insurance
industry. As a result, the industry is more competitive than it was 10
years ago. Profit margins have declined. Capital and surplus levels have
declined. Companies that could comfortably ride out bad times, like the
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the liability side of the balance sheet has changed. Today life insurance
companies offer more investment-oriented products, such as single-
premium life, universal life, and guaranteed investment contracts, as
well as traditional products with higher cash surrender values like
participating whole life insurance. In order to offer higher returns, some
insurers are taking more risks on the asset side of the balance sheet as
well. As a consequence, the industry is more vulnerable to failure than
it once was.
The product innovations in the life insurance industry over the past
several years could result in an abuse of the solvency system. But, as I
will discuss later, controlling possible abuse is feasible. It can be done
without denying protection for the values associated with these policies.
Brannon’s Solvency Suggestions
Brannon and I agree that today solvency is a major problem in the
life insurance industry. We do not agree about the solution to the
problem.
Brannon suggests that solvency protection provided for insurance
consumers should be limited to the death benefit provided by the policy.
He asserts that the protection should not extend to the cash value or
"savings" associated with the policy. Clearly, Brannon goes too far in
suggesting that solvency protection should be denied to the cash value
in any life insurance policy. Solvency protection should be provided to
all persons who buy life insurance and whose quality of life would be
imperiled by the failure of their insurer to fulfill its promises. The loss of
the protection afforded by a permanent life policy or a universal life
policy, both of which have cash value, is just as devastating to a
consumer (especially one who has become uninsurable) as the loss of
the protection provided by a term policy that does not have cash value.
Any "solution" to the solvency problem that does not cover assets is
probably unworkable and is certainly incomplete.
For these reasons I believe Brannon’s suggestions regarding how
the solvency problem might be solved miss their mark. Before offering
my suggestions regarding how the industry could approach the sol-
vency problem, I want to discuss several fundamental principles that
should be included in any solution to the solvency problem.
Principles regarding Solvency Solution
Any solution to the solvency problem must protect the interests of
the insurance consumer. It would not be acceptable simply to protect life
insurance "insiders," such as industry executives, sales representatives,
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In addition, all the interested parties should be required to make a
contribution toward the cost resulting from the insolvency of a com-
pany. The contributors should include all life insurance companies,
including the insolvent company, life insurance sales representatives,
state insurance regulators, and all life insurance consumers affected by
the insolvency. The present system, which unfairly requires that only
financially successful life insurance companies cover the cost of an
insolvency, must be abandoned.
Improved Regulations
The regulations that help prevent insurance companies from be-
coming insolvent must be improved to meet the solvency problem.
Specifically, life insurance companies must be required to meet risk-
based capital and surplus requirements. In other words, a company
should maintain high investment reserves if it follows a high-risk,
high-yield investment strategy. A company also needs to maintain high
reserves where liquidity is lacking or where the company does not
match assets and liabilities.
Reserve requirements should also be strengthened, and the opinion
of a valuation actuary should be required on asset-liability matching.
Prudent insurers that write investment-oriented business have been
matching assets and liabilities since the early 1980s. New York State law
requires matching. All states should require it.
Investment restrictions should be strengthened. Insurance regula-
tions must take into account the growing dependence by the industry on
investments other than stocks and bonds, such as junk bonds and
commercial mortgages.
Accounting practices should be improved, as should audit and
examination practices. Controls over reinsurance transactions should be
strengthened. Perhaps most important, insurance regulators should
have sufficient resources to do a good job. In the past, state insurance
departments have not had the resources they need. This situation has
been worsened by the recent fiscal crises faced by many states, including
Massachusetts.
Guaranty Fund Improvements
Guaranty funds maintained by any government for the benefit of
life insurance consumers need improvement to meet the solvency
problem. Every life insurance company that becomes insolvent places a
heavy financial burden on well-managed insurers to make good on the
promises made by the insolvent company to its policyholders. In effect,
well-managed life insurance companies pay twice--once when they lose
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insolvent, and a second time when they are assessed by guaranty funds
to pay for the insolvent companies’ promises.
Today the insurance industry sustains guaranty funds by assess-
ments on solvent companies. In other words, when an insolvency
occurs, state guaranty funds raise the money needed to cover losses by
an assessment on solvent companies. It would be better to fund the
insolvency by advance assessments on all life insurers. By doing so,
even insurers that ultimately become insolvent would contribute toward
the costs arising from the insolvency.
The amount assessed in advance should be determined on a
risk-adjusted basis. It seems reasonable that companies creating the
greatest risk should be required to make the largest contributions to the
guaranty funds. To make this plan effective, insurance regulators should
select the factors that will show the degree of risk involved in each
company. They also should make advance assessments based on their
determination of the risk created by each individual insurance company.
As mentioned above, four groups should pay for the cost of
insolvencies: other insurance companies, insurance sales representa-
tives, the government, and insurance consumers. Insurance companies
should help pay for the cost of insolvencies because they have a
self-interest in maintaining the reputation of the industry. Life insurance
sales representatives should be required to contribute to the guaranty
fund maintained for the benefit of their clients. Insurance consumers
rely on the advice they receive from their sales representatives. If the
representative is financially at risk, the representative will be more likely
to sell insurance written by a financially secure insurer. Contributions
could be obtained from sales representatives by requiring that they
contribute to the guaranty fund before they can obtain their license to
sell insurance.
State insurance regulators should also be required to contribute to
the cost resulting from an insolvency involving insured persons living in
their state. This requirement should be imposed because the cost
incurred would give the state a strong incentive to regulate vigorously to
prevent insolvencies. The contribution from the state could be obtained
by permitting insurance companies to offset their guaranty fund contri-
butions against their state premium tax liability. Many states already
permit this.
Insurance consumers also should bear part of the cost if the
company they select later becomes insolvent. This could be done easily
by limiting the amount of their recovery to a portion of their loss. For
example, under California’s new law, insured persons can recover only
80 percent of their claim. Forcing consumers to bear a portion of their
loss might encourage them to investigate carefully before they choose
their insurer. This might help reduce the financial burden resulting from
the insolvency of insurers.DISCUSSION 237
Who Should Administer the Solvency System?
These are the principles needed for an effective solution to the
solvency problem. But who should be responsible for administering the
solution? Two ways to deal with the solvency problem are being
considered. One involves strengthening state regulation of the solvency
of the life insurance industry. The other involves federal oversight of life
insurance industry solvency matters.
Many responsible persons in the life insurance industry believe the
best approach is to strengthen state regulation of solvency. They believe
that the NAIC should develop model laws and regulations for this
purpose to be adopted by the states. This process is already underway.
Leaders in the NAIC, like Commissioner Earl R. Pomeroy, have taken
the initiative in this effort, which the life insurance industry supports.
A successful NAIC effort will meet the needs of insurance consum-
ers and it will preserve the existing scheme of insurance regulation. But
the important question is "Will the effort succeed?" Will all the states
adopt the NAIC model laws? If the states do act, will they do so without
making meaningful changes in the NAIC model laws? And will all the
states have all the resources needed to regulate effectively under the ¯
new system?
These are troublesome questions. The problem today is bad
enough! It will be infinitely worse if the industry~its leaders, its sales
representatives, and its regulators--promises a solution and then fails to
deliver it.
Some thoughtful leaders in the industry and some representatives
in Congress suggest federal oversight of life insurance solvency as
another solution. This approach would use a federal "lever" to promote
a uniform, minimally competent level of state regulation, but would
otherwise minimize federal involvement in insurance regulation.
To obtain this result, Congress could simply enact a law setting
forth: (1) specific and uniform solvency standards; (2) specific guaranty
fund provisions; and (3) minimum financial resource and competency
standards for state insurance departments. The federal law would
further provide that these provisions should be adopted by the states
within a stated period, say two years. Adoption of these provisions by
the states would be a condition for continuation of the privilege given
insurers under the McCarran-Ferguson Act to sell insurance in interstate
commerce, while also being regulated by the states and not by the
federal government.
The federal law also should provide that, if an individual state fails
to enact a timely law adopting the federal solvency standards, insurance
companies domiciled in that state would be prohibited from selling
insurance in interstate commerce outside that state. To give relief to
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ciled in such a state would be allowed to sell insurance outside their
state of domicile if they agree to be bound by the laws of any other state
that had adopted the federal solvency standards.
This federal oversight approach is an attempt to preserve the
traditional role of the states in regulating life insurance activities, and
particularly solvency, while also ensuring that the provisions to protect
insurance consumers from solvency losses are adopted uniformly and
are applied effectively throughout the country.
Which approach should we support? A successful effort to improve
state regulation is most desirable. The efforts of the NAIC and individual
state commissioners to improve state regulation are commendable. On
the other hand, the General Accounting Office recently studied this
effort carefully and concluded that it will not succeed, even though it is
highly laudable. The reason given: the NAIC does not have the
jurisdictional clout to obtain the desired result.
If the effort to improve state regulation fails, we should all support
federal solvency standards and federal oversight of solvency through a
system like the one I have described. The life insurance industry serves
an important need of its customers and, more broadly speaking, an
important need of our society. We have a duty and an ethical obligation
to meet our responsibilities to our policyholders. The solvency problem
must be solved, and it will be. If it can be solved at the state level, fine.
But, if federal intervention is necessary to obtain an effective solution,
the industry should accept the federal role because a solution to the
solvency problem is "the right thing to do."